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1 Introduction
The large literature on the gains-from-trade proposition initiated by Samuelson (1939)
generally asserts that free trade is gainful to all the participating nations.1 Moreover, the
so-called `new trade theory' which incorporates imperfect competition and/or increasing
returns has found a new source for gains from trade. Among others, Markusen (1981)
makes it clear that the opening of trade promotes competition, from which trading coun-
tries can gain. However, environmental considerations are usually missing in the existing
literature on gains from trade under imperfect competition although such considerations
seem to play an important part in recent negotiations over more liberalized trade regimes
at both global and regional scales. This is exempli¯ed in the debates over NAFTA where
freer commercial interactions in North America was opposed by some partly on the ground
of environmental protection. Similar arguments have been frequently made by some en-
vironmental groups who persistently resist so-called globalization, as was symbolically
manifested in their feverish oppositions towards the World Trade Organization (WTO)
Round Talk in Seattle in 1999.
As it would be easily imaginable, possible existence of gains from international trade
in a polluting product is dependent on the market structure as well as the preferences
of citizens. On top of these, when the pollution issue is transboundary by nature, the
welfare impact of international trade could also depend on the physical characteristics of
a pollution issue. The welfare implications of environmental variables in transboundary
pollution problems have been typically investigated in game-theoretic studies without
accounting for international trade. Important examples of such studies are MÄaler (1990)
and Tahvonen, Kaitala, and Pohjola (1993) for °ow pollution, and Kaitala, Pohjola and
Tahvonen (1992) and MÄaler and de Zeeuw (1998) for stock pollution.
Conversely, though, there might be situations where the form of an international
competition in a polluting good market should not be given a priori and could be in-
°uenced by the characteristics of the environmental problem at hand. This paper aims
to explore such a possibility by explicitly modeling the strategic interaction surrounding
1Kemp and Wan (1972) and Grandmont and McFadden (1972) generalize Samuelson's (1939) propo-
sition in a quite general Arrow-Debreu model.
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governmental decision makings which, consequently, determine possible modes of inter-
national trade in the presence of transboundary pollution associated with the production
of a potentially tradable good. In particular, we demonstrate that both Stackelberg and
Cournot-Nash types of competition, in addition to the autarkic situation, are possible
equilibrium outcomes concerning the tradeable polluting good market, depending upon
the magnitudes of certain economic and environmental variables, such as discount rate,
marginal damage cost of pollution and decay rates of pollution stocks, as well as how
similar the concerned nations are in these aspects.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents our basic model of an economy
with transboundary stock pollution and derives its autarkic outcome. By extending the
model to a two-country world, the next section characterizes potential free trade outcomes
in two di®erent modes of international competition. Then, Section 4 describes a game
between two governments and discusses its equilibrium results. The last section contains
brief concluding remarks.
2 Autarky
This section develops our basic model and describes its autarkic outcome. The model
is comprised of two countries (Home and Foreign), two goods (Goods 1 and 2), and one
primary factor (labor). We assume that both countries share the identical preferences
and production technologies, and produce both goods. In the following description of
our model, we focus on Home since the Foreign country can be described symmetrically.
We denote each Foreign variable by attaching an asterisk (*). Furthermore, Good 2
serves as a numeraire and is produced with a unitary input coe±cient so that the wage
rate is internationally equalized and ¯xed at unity. In the autarkic case, Good 1 is
monopolistically supplied by a single domestic ¯rm and c > 0 units of labor are required
to produce one unit of Good 1. Hence, the marginal cost of production is assumed to be
constant at c. In addition, we suppose that the production of one unit of Good 1 entails
one unit of pollutant emissions.
Now, let us assume that the utility function of a representative consumer in Home
3
can be speci¯ed by
V =
Z 1
0
e¡rt
·
AC1 ¡ C
2
1
2
+ C2 ¡ sZ
¸
dt; A > c; s > 0; (1)
where V is the consumer's utility level, r is its discount rate, Ci; i = 1; 2, is the consump-
tion of each good, s is the constant marginal damage cost of its pollutant stock, and Z is
the pollution stock level in this country. We assume, however, that the generation of the
pollutant emissions associated with the consumption of Good 1 is treated as a negative
externality by this consumer and, therefore, out of its control. Hence, the consumer op-
timizes its utility by ignoring the adverse e®ects of the stock pollution completely. This
is essentially the same as the case where the consumer optimizes its instantaneous utility
without considering the environmental damage cost.
Letting p denotes the price of Good 1 measured by the price of Good 2, this consumer's
utility maximization problem subject to the budget constraint yields the demand function
of Good 1:
C1 = A¡ p:
Under autarky, the market-clearing condition is
A¡ p = x;
where x is the output of Good 1. Hence, the inverse demand function and the monopoly
¯rm's pro¯t at each time instant are respectively de¯ned by
p = A¡ x; (2)
¼ ´ (A¡ c¡ x)x: (3)
Using (2) and (3), the long-term social welfare of the nation, U , which is the sum of
the consumer surplus, the monopolist's pro¯t, and the environmental damage cost of the
pollution over the in¯nite time horizon, can be expressed as
U =
Z 1
0
e¡rt
·
(A¡ p)2
2
+ ¼ ¡ sZ
¸
dt: (4)
In the subsequent analysis, (4) determines an overall payo® of the government in each
situation.
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As for the transboundary e®ects of the pollutant emissions, we assume that one unit
of Foreign's (resp. Home's) pollutant emissions x¤ (resp. x) increases Home's (resp. For-
eign's) current pollutant °ow level by the fraction of ® 2 [0; 1] (resp. ®¤) while one unit of
domestic emissions increases its own pollutant °ow by one unit. In the literature of envi-
ronmental economics, ® and ®¤ are sometimes referred to as `transportation coe±cients',
but we call them `pollutant import coe±cients' here in order to emphasize the directions
of the pollutant °ow. In the case of global pollution, such as CO2 that is a culprit of the
global warming problem, we have ® = ®¤ = 1, while both ® and ®¤ are normally strictly
smaller than one and take di®erent values in so-called regional environmental issues, such
as the transboundary acid rain problem in Northern Europe. When ® = ®¤ = 0, on the
other hand, the pollution problem is completely localized. In sum, the pollution levels in
the respective countries are described as
_Z = x+ ®x¤ ¡ kZ; (5)
_Z¤ = x¤ + ®¤x¡ k¤Z¤; (6)
where _Z and _Z¤ respectively denote the time derivatives of the pollutant stocks, and
k and k¤ are so-called decay rates of the pollutant stocks in the respective countries.
In this article, we assume that, while the preference-related variables of the consumers,
such as discount rates and marginal costs of the pollution, and ¯rms' production costs
are exactly symmetric across the two countries, the environmental variables, such as
pollutant import coe±cients and decay rate of the pollutants can be diverse, and mainly
focus on the impacts of the latter variables on the equilibrium outcomes.
Let us now formulate the optimization problem of each country's ¯rm. For simplicity
of the exposition, we write the behaviors of the ¯rms in both countries in a completely
static fashion although the ¯rms' actual behaviors would not change at all if they max-
imized their respective pro¯ts dynamically since the ¯rms do not care about the stock
pollution issue, quite similarly to the consumer who regards the pollution problem as
an externality. Again, we focus on the Home ¯rm since its Foreign counterpart acts in
exactly the same fashion. Speci¯cally, the Home ¯rm solves the following problem in the
autarkic case:
max
x
(A¡ c¡ x)x;
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whose solution can be immediately obtained as
xA =
A¡ c
2
; (7)
where the superscript A represents the autarkic outcome. Also, the autarkic price is
derived from the demand function as
pA =
A+ c
2
: (8)
Substituting (7) into (5), we have2
_ZA = (1 + ®)
A¡ c
2
¡ kZA;
where ZA is the pollutant stock in Home under autarky. This is a simple ¯rst-order
linear ordinary di®erential equation, which can be easily solved and yields the path of
the pollutant stock over time in Home as
ZA = e¡ktZ0 + (1¡ e¡kt)(1 + ®)(A¡ c)
2k
; (9)
where Z0 is the initial pollutant stock level in Home.
Throughout this paper, let us express the total value of social welfare of each country
by excluding the in°uence of the initial pollutant stock level. This is acceptable for our
main purpose here, i.e., to analyze an strategic interaction between the governments by
comparing their individual relative payo®s under the respective situations, because the
marginal damage cost of the pollution is assumed constant. If the damage cost function
were nonlinear, the initial pollutant stock level would matter. Hence, by substituting the
time-path of the pollutant stock in (9) except the term involving Z0, as well as (3) and
(8) into (4), the payo® of the Home government in the autarkic outcome can be written
as
UA =
3
8
(A¡ c)2
Z 1
0
e¡rtdt¡ s(1 + ®)(A¡ c)
2k
Z 1
0
e¡rt
£
1¡ e¡kt¤ dt
=
3
8r
(A¡ c)2 ¡ s(1 + ®)
2r(r + k)
(A¡ c): (10)
2Note that the ¯rm in Foreign produces the same amount of Good 1 as Home's ¯rm in the autarkic case
by our symmetry assumptions on the characteristics of the ¯rms as well as the representative consumers
across the countries.
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It should be noted that, even under autarky, the welfare of Home is a®ected by the
production level in Foreign through the transboundary pollution in (5). Hence, there
exists a negative externality associated with the production of Good 1 across the two
countries. The next section extends this model to an international duopoly in two di®erent
modes of competition.
3 International duopoly
When the two domestic markets of Good 1 described above is fully integrated interna-
tionally, the new market-clearing condition becomes
C1 + C
¤
1 = 2(A¡ p) = x+ x¤;
which is inverted to yield
p = A¡ x+ x
¤
2
: (11)
This de¯nes the inverse demand function for Good 1 in the international market of Good
1 and each ¯rm's pro¯t function becomes
¼ =
µ
A¡ c¡ x+ x
¤
2
¶
x:
First, we consider the case where the two ¯rms are engaged in a Cournot-type competition
in this aggregated market. In essence, these ¯rms determine their respective output
supply levels concurrently. Speci¯cally, these two ¯rms respectively attempt to solve the
following optimization problems:
max
x
¼ =
µ
A¡ c¡ x+ x
¤
2
¶
x;
max
x¤
¼¤ =
µ
A¡ c¡ x+ x
¤
2
¶
x¤:
We can immediately obtain the ¯rst-order conditions:
A¡ c¡ x
¤
2
¡ x = 0;
A¡ c¡ x
2
¡ x¤ = 0;
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which lead to their respective reaction functions:
x = A¡ c¡ x
¤
2
; (12)
x¤ = A¡ c¡ x
2
: (13)
Solving these equations simultaneously, we can obtain the Cournot-Nash equilibrium
levels of output supply for the respective ¯rms:
xC = x¤C =
2(A¡ c)
3
: (14)
Furthermore, the equilibrium price becomes
pC =
A+ 2c
3
: (15)
Comparing (8) and (15), we can easily con¯rm pC < pA, which implies that the pro-
competitive e®ect of the opening of international trade surfaces under the Cournot-Nash
competition.
Moreover, the payo® of the Home government can be obtained in the exact same
way as in the autarkic case above. Consequently, we have the Home government's payo®
except the e®ect of the initial pollutant stock level as
UC =
4
9r
(A¡ c)2 ¡ 2s(1 + ®)
3r(r + k)
(A¡ c): (16)
As another possible mode of international duopoly under free trade, we also consider
the case where the two ¯rms are engaged in a Stackelberg type competition. In a Stack-
elberg duopoly game, the leading ¯rm is somehow able to make a credible commitment
with respect to the supply level of Good 1 prior to its follower.
Substituting (13) into the de¯nition of ¼ above, the Home ¯rm's pro¯t function, when
it acts as the Stackelberg leader, can be described as
¼ =
µ
A¡ c¡ x+ x
¤
2
¶
x
=
µ
A¡ c
2
¡ x
4
¶
x:
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Thus, from the pro¯t maximization problem of this Stackelberg leader, we can easily
derive the following levels of output supply in a Stackelberg equilibrium:
xL = A¡ c; (17)
xF =
A¡ c
2
; (18)
where xL and xF respectively denote the output levels of the leader and the follower.
Furthermore, the equilibrium price, pS, becomes
pS = A¡ x
S + x¤S
2
=
A+ 3c
4
: (19)
Comparing (15) and (19), we can observe pS < pC , i.e., the price of Good 1 is lower
under the Stackelberg competition than under the Cournot-Nash competition. Hence,
the procompetitive e®ect of international trade is strengthened further in the Stackelberg
outcome.
In a similar way to the autarkic case above, substituting (17) and (18) into (5), we can
obtain the path of the pollutant stock over time. Then, by substituting this time-path of
the pollutant stock as well as (3) and (19) into (4), we have the payo®s of the countries
with the leader ¯rm and the follower ¯rm, respectively, as
UL =
17
32r
(A¡ c)2 ¡ s(2 + ®)
2r(r + k)
(A¡ c); (20)
UF =
13
32r
(A¡ c)2 ¡ s(1 + 2®)
2r(r + k)
(A¡ c): (21)
Once again, these payo® values are described by excluding the e®ects of the initial pol-
lutant stocks just for the simplicity of exposition.
4 Inter-governmental game
In this section, we introduce a game between Home and Foreign governments over their
respective ¯rms' roles in the international market of Good 1. We assume that this game
takes place, once and for all, prior to the international duopoly game by the ¯rms de-
scribed above, and the players are the governments of the two nations, instead of the
¯rms themselves as is commonly supposed in the endogenous-timing literature.3
3Syropoulos (1994) analyzed the endogenous timing game of governmental trade interventions with
di®erent policy instruments in a similar framework to Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). Our model di®ers
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In this study, we suppose that the government can intervene the market only as re-
gards the timing of the move by its own ¯rm in the international market of Good 1 at
each time-instant and it does not possess any other kinds of policy measures. We con-
sider that, although the implementation of an environmental policy might be di±cult for
informational and/or institutional reasons, national governments could make announce-
ments that e®ectively commit their own ¯rms to the speci¯c timings of the moves in
this particular international duopoly, and jointly determine their respective roles in this
market.
For simplicity, the strategy space of our inter-governmental game is restricted to f1,
2, no tradeg and we only consider pure strategies. When one government chooses 1 and
the other chooses 2, the former nation's ¯rm assumes the role of the Stackelberg leader
in the in¯nitely-repeated international duopolistic competition that follows, while the
¯rm in the latter country becomes the Stackelberg follower. When the two governments
choose the same number, the mode of international competition becomes that of the
Cournot-Nash type, i.e., the concurrent choices of output supply levels by the two ¯rms
at each time-instant. Moreover, we suppose that a ¯rm cannot export its product when
its government decides to close the domestic market to import from the other country.
Hence, when at least one of the two governments chooses `no trade', the autarkic situation
arises in each country. The payo® matrix of this inter-governmental game is described in
Figure 1, with all the payo® values corresponding to the ones described in the previous
sections.
(Figure 1 around here)
Observing Figure 1, in combination with the payo®s of the governments under di®er-
ent circumstances obtained above, we can derive the Nash equilibrium outcomes of this
inter-governmental game and, therefore, the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium outcomes
of the whole game, possibly including the international duopolistic competition between
the two ¯rms afterward unless the outcome of the inter-governmental game is `autarky'.
As we discuss below, the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium outcomes of this whole game
from his framework in that an outcome of the governmental interaction determines the timings of moves
in a game where they themselves do not participate directly.
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can be categorized into several di®erent classes, depending upon the values of the eco-
nomic and environmental variables. In particular, we focus upon the magnitudes of the
two environmental variables, i.e., k, the decay rate of the pollutant stock, and ®, the
transboundary pollutant import coe±cient, as well as upon whether the two countries
are symmetric or not in these respects.
4.1 Symmetric case
We begin our analysis of the inter-governmental game above with a simple case where the
two countries share the same values of k and ®. That is, we suppose that k = k¤ and ® =
®¤ in this subsection. Despite the fact that the two countries are completely symmetric
in both environmental and economic aspects, we have indeed various possibilities as
equilibrium outcomes of this game, depending on the magnitudes of these variables. The
¯rst ¯nding is summarized in the following statement.
Proposition 1. The Cournot-Nash competition in the international market can be a
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium outcome for the values of k and ® that satisfy the
following inequality :
k + r >
12s(1 + ®)
5(A¡ c) ; (22)
and, at least, one of the following two inequalities :
k + r <
48s(2 + ®)
25(A¡ c) ; (23)
k + r >
48s(1¡ 2®)
11(A¡ c) : (24)
Proof. By construction, the autarkic situation always constitutes a subgame-perfect
Nash equilibrium of the whole game. This is because, whatever action it may take, a
government's payo® is the same autarkic one when the other government chooses `no
trade' in the inter-governmental game. We now attempt to show that the Cournot-Nash
competition can also be an equilibrium outcome under the conditions described above. In
order for the Cournot-Nash type competition to be a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium
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in addition to the autarkic situation, the government must, at least, prefer the Cournot-
Nash outcome to the autarkic one. Taking the ratio of UA in (10) and UC in (16), and
setting UA=UC < 1 yields (22). Moreover, we need to exclude the circumstances under
which one government wishes its ¯rm to be the Stackelberg leader and the other wishes
its ¯rms to be the Stackelberg follower at the same time, in comparison with having
their ¯rms compete in the Cournot-Nash fashion. Taking the ratio of UL in (20) and
UC and setting UL=UC < 1 leads to (23). If this inequality is met, the government
prefers to have its ¯rm become one of the Cournot-Nash competitors to having its ¯rm
become the Stackelberg leader. On the other hand, the government would be better o® by
having its ¯rm become a Cournot-Nash competitor rather than the Stackelberg follower
if UF=UC < 1 holds. Taking the ratio of UF and UC and setting UF=UC < 1 leads to
(24).4 Q.E.D.
Proposition 1 implies that, if the actual values of the variables fall in the region C in
Figure 2 with ® on the horizontal axis and (k+r) on the vertical axis,5 the Cournot-Nash
competition in the international market can bring net gain from trade to each country.
(Figure 2 around here)
More interestingly, in addition to the Cournot-Nash type competition, there is a
possibility that a Stackelberg-type competition arises as an equilibrium outcome in the
international market even with two completely symmetric countries.
Proposition 2. The Stackelberg-type competition emerges as a subgame-perfect Nash
4Condition (24) is meaningful only if ® < 1=2 because UF > UC trivially holds for any ® > 1=2.
5Since k and r virtually play the same roles in our results, we mainly express them in such a combi-
nation.
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equilibrium outcome when k and ® satisfy the following four conditions simultaneously :
r + k >
16s
5(A¡ c) ; (25)
r + k >
16s®
A¡ c; (26)
r + k >
48s(2 + ®)
25(A¡ c) ; (27)
r + k <
48s(1¡ 2®)
11(A¡ c) : (28)
Furthermore, if the following inequality is satis¯ed, the ¯rst-mover, i.e., the Stackelberg
leader, is relatively better o® than the second mover, i.e., the Stackelberg follower, and,
otherwise, the second mover has an advantage:
r + k >
4s(1¡ ®)
A¡ c ; (29)
Proof. In order for a Stackelberg competition to be a Nash equilibrium outcome of the
inter-governmental game, ¯rst of all, the Stackelberg outcome has to be superior to the
autarkic outcome for both countries. Such conditions are given by UA=UL < 1 and
UA=UF < 1, which are respectively translated into (25) and (26). Moreover, these two
countries must simultaneously be better o® under the Stackelberg equilibrium in com-
parison with the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Hence, it must be the case that UL=UC > 1
or UF=UC > 1, which are respectively transformed into (27) and (28). Moreover, we
have the case of the ¯rst mover advantage if UL=UF > 1, which can be expressed as (29).
Q.E.D.
The region of having a Stackelberg-type competition as a subgame perfect Nash equilib-
rium outcome is depicted as region S in Figure 2. Even when the Cournot-Nash outcome
is dominated by the autarkic outcome for both countries, under the conditions of Propo-
sition 2 the Stackelberg outcome can constitute an equilibrium and free trade becomes
mutually bene¯cial to the respective countries. We need to add, however, that the likeli-
hood of having a Stackelberg-type competition as an equilibrium outcome would be quite
slim in this symmetric case, as we can infer from the very limited area of region S in
Figure 2
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When neither of the conditions of Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 is met, autarky is
the only equilibrium outcome. The region that satis¯es the conditions for the realization
of such an outcome is depicted as the non-shaded region A in Figure 2. Irrespective of
the pollutant import coe±cient (®), as long as the decay rate of the pollutant stock (k)
is su±ciently low given the discount rate (r), the government would be strictly better o®
by remaining in the autarkic situation and, as a consequence, the international trade of
Good 1 may not materialize between the two countries. In other words, if a country is
su±ciently vulnerable to the pollution issue, in terms of a slow decay of the pollutant
stock, it rationally opts for autarky for the fear of the long-term e®ect of the pollution,
even though free trade in the good itself could be mutually gainful.
In one extreme case of ® = ®¤ = 0, where the pollution problem is completely
localized, all of the three types of outcomes, i.e., autarky, Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg
competitions in the aggregated market, are possible, depending on the magnitude of
the decay rate of the pollutant stock, k. When k + r < 12s
5(A¡c) holds, autarky is the
only equilibrium outcome. When 96s
25(A¡c) < k + r <
48s
11(A¡c) holds, on the other hand, the
Stackelberg type competition becomes an equilibrium outcome. When either 12s
5(A¡c) < k+
r < 96s
25(A¡c) or
48s
11(A¡c) < k+ r holds, the Cournot-Nash type competition can materialize.
In summary, if the pollutant decay rate is su±ciently high, i.e., k > 12s
5(A¡c) ¡ r, the
gain from trade can be captured by each country in this completely localized pollution
problem.
In the other extreme case of ® = ®¤ = 1, on the other hand, the Stackelberg-type
competition never occurs since no country would be content with allowing its ¯rm to
become the Stackelberg follower. If k + r < 24s
5(A¡c) holds, autarky is the only equilibrium
outcome and, otherwise, the Cournot-Nash type competition can also be an equilibrium
outcome. Hence, in a global pollution problem with two symmetric nations, the gains of
trade is less likely to materialize than in the localized pollution case, with k = 24
5(A¡c) ¡ r
is the threshold value of having the gains from trade in terms of the decay rate, instead of
k = 12
5(A¡c)¡r. As we can easily imagine, the gain from trade is more likely to materialize
as the pollution issue is more localized since the line, UA = UC , is monotone increasing
in ® in Figure 2.
14
4.2 Asymmetric case
When the two countries are asymmetric in terms of having di®erent values of decay
rates of their respective pollutant stocks (k) and pollutant import coe±cients (®), we
need to examine each government's preferred outcomes separately. Accordingly, we have
far greater possibilities as potential equilibrium outcomes than in the symmetric case
above. Especially, the possibility of a Stackelberg equilibrium signi¯cantly expands in
the asymmetric case, compared to the symmetric case. In order to simplify the following
exposition, as a possible form of Stackelberg-type competition, we focus on the case where
Home's ¯rm is the Stackelberg leader and Foreign's ¯rm is the follower. It should be noted
that exactly the same argument holds even when the roles in a Stackelberg equilibrium
are reversed between the two ¯rms.
Before discussing a Stackelberg equilibrium outcome, we ¯rst present the next state-
ment concerning the Cournot-Nash outcome.
Proposition 3. When k, ®, k¤, and ®¤ satisfy the following two conditions :
k + r >
12s(1 + ®)
5(A¡ c) ; (30)
k¤ + r >
12(1 + ®¤)
5(A¡ c) ; (31)
and, in addition, one of the following two conditions, the Cournot-Nash competition be-
comes an equilibrium outcome and both countries can potentially gain from trade:6
k + r <
48s(2 + ®)
25(A¡ c) ; (32)
k¤ + r >
48s(1¡ 2®)
11(A¡ c) : (33)
Proof. When (30) and (31) are satis¯ed for the respective countries, both of them can
gain by moving from autarky to the Cournot-Nash type competition under free trade.
However, a Stackelberg outcome may be even more bene¯cial than the Cournot-Nash
6Recall that (33) is meaningful only if ®¤ < 1=2 since any value of ®¤ > 1=2 leads to U¤C > U¤F
trivially.
15
outcome to both nations. Restricting our attention to a Stackelberg equilibrium where
Home's ¯rm is the leader and Foreign's ¯rm the follower, we can safely exclude such a
possibility if either UL=UC < 1 or U¤F=U¤C < 1 is satis¯ed. Each of these conditions can
be expressed as (32) and (33). Q.E.D.
Again, as in the symmetric case above, the autarkic situation always constitutes a sub-
game perfect Nash equilibrium outcome of the whole game. However, this equilibrium is
weakly dominated by the other equilibrium outcome of the Cournot-Nash type competi-
tion when the conditions of Proposition 3 above are met.
In addition to the Cournot-Nash type competition, a Stackelberg type competition
which also weakly dominates the autarkic situation can arise.
Proposition 4. When k, ®, k¤, and ®¤ satisfy the following four conditions simultane-
ously, the Stackelberg-type competition with Home's ¯rm being the leader and Foreign's
¯rm being the follower emerges as a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium outcome.
k + r >
16s
5(A¡ c) ; (34)
k + r <
48s(2 + ®)
25(A¡ c) ; (35)
k¤ + r >
16s®¤
(A¡ c) ; (36)
k¤ + r <
48s(1¡ 2®¤)
11(A¡ c) : (37)
Proof. In order for this Stackelberg outcome to be a Nash equilibrium of the inter-
governmental game, ¯rst of all, the Stackelberg outcome has to be superior to the autarkic
outcome for both countries. Such conditions are given by UA=UL < 1 and U¤A=U¤F < 1,
which are respectively translated into (34) and (36). Moreover, the respective countries
must simultaneously be better o® under the Stackelberg equilibrium in comparison with
the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Hence, it must be the case that UL=UC > 1 or U¤F=U¤C >
1, which are respectively transformed into (35) and (37). Q.E.D.
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The region of having this type of Stackelberg competition as a subgame-perfect Nash
equilibrium outcome is depicted as region S and S¤ in Figure 3. It should also be
noted that a symmetric argument can be made for the case where Foreign's ¯rm is the
Stackelberg leader and Home's ¯rm is its follower.
(Figure 3 around here)
When neither of the conditions of Proposition 3 and Proposition 4 is met, autarky
is the only equilibrium outcome. Similarly to the symmetric case above, when its decay
rate of its pollutant stock is su±ciently low given the pollutant import coe±cient, the
government tends to be strictly better o® by remaining in the autarkic situation and, as
a consequence, the international trade of Good 1 may not materialize between the two
countries. Even when the Cournot-Nash outcome is dominated by the autarkic outcome
for both countries, however, the Stackelberg outcome can also be an equilibrium and free
trade is bene¯cial to the two countries in this asymmetric case as long as the conditions
of Proposition 4 is met. Hence, we can state, at least, in the context of our analytical
model, that gain from trade is more likely to be captured by each country with stronger
dissimilarity in the environmental characteristics across the country.
In view of Proposition 4, we can obtain further insights into the nature of a Stackelberg
outcome. Firstly, it implies that, in order for a Stackelberg outcome to be an equilibrium,
there needs to be a country with a fairly small import coe±cient of the transboundary
pollution. This country must also have a su±ciently low value of the decay rate of
the pollutant stock. If these two conditions are concurrently met, this environmentally-
vulnerable country would be willing to have its ¯rm become the Stackelberg follower since
its consumer bene¯ts from a lower price due to the expanded supply of Good 1 but does
not have to su®er too greatly from the transboundary pollution due to the associated
expansion of the polluting good production in the other nation as long as the value of
the pollutant import coe±cient is su±ciently small.
Secondly, when there exists a Stackelberg equilibrium, it is generally the case that the
¯rm in a country with a higher decay rate of the pollutant stock becomes the Stackelberg
leader. The country whose ¯rm is the Stackelberg leader is going to experience a signi¯-
cant increase in its domestic production of the polluting good. A country with a higher
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value of k is more resistant to the increased pollutant °ow associated with this expanded
domestic production and likely to assume the role of the Stackelberg leader.
In one extreme case of ® = ®¤ = 0, i.e., when the pollution problem is completely
localized, all of the three outcomes are possible, depending on the magnitudes of the
decay rates of the pollutant stocks, k and k¤. Especially, when 96s
25(A¡c) < k + r and
k¤+ r < 48s
11(A¡c) simultaneously hold, the Stackelberg type competition with Home's ¯rm
being its leader becomes an equilibrium outcome. It should be noted that, unlike the
symmetric case above, even when the pollutant decay rate in one country is quite low, the
gain from trade can be captured by each country in a localized pollution problem, provided
that the other country's pollutant decay rate is su±ciently high in the asymmetric case.
In the other extreme case of ® = ®¤ = 1, on the other hand, the Stackelberg-type
competition never occurs since no country would be content with allowing its ¯rm to
become the Stackelberg follower. Nevertheless, the gain from trade can realize to each
country even in this global pollution case as long as 24s
5(A¡c) < k + r and
24s
5(A¡c) < k
¤ + r
simultaneously hold.
5 Concluding remarks
Our analytical ¯ndings might provide some new insights into practical policymaking issues
surrounding trade liberalization when a transboundary stock pollution problem is one of
each government's interests. Trade liberalization in a good whose production generates
transboundary pollutant emissions has two opposing e®ects: procompetitive e®ect and
pollution-expansion e®ect. The welfare implications of these e®ects of international trade
could be contingent on certain environmental characteristics of each country, among other
things.
In our particular game model, the governments intervene the market with respect
to the timings of their ¯rms' entering into the international market and, consequently,
determine the roles of their respective ¯rms there. The results of our analysis indicate
that decay rates of pollutant stocks and transfer coe±cients of transboundary pollution
might play signi¯cant roles in determining not only the existence of net gain from trade
but also the type of competition in the international market of such an product. Al-
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though the government tends to forgo the trade opportunity when the stock pollution
exerts environmental damages for a prolonged period of time, a smaller pollutant import
coe±cient and dissimilarity between the two countries on these environmental aspects
could nevertheless create an opportunity to bring gains from trade to both nations.
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HomenForeign 1 2 no trade
1 UC ; UC UL; UF UA; UA
2 UF ; UL UC ; UC UA; UA
no trade UA; UA UA; UA UA; UA
Figure 1: Payo® matrix of the timing game
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UF = UA
UL = UA
Figure 2: Regions for the respective outcomes in the symmetric case
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Figure 3: Regions for a Stackelberg outcome in the asymmetric case
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